

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L IAEA VIENNA 9822

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, IAEA, UR

SUBJECT: US-SOVIET CONSULTATIONS: NPT EXPORTERS COMMITTEE

SUMMARY: DURING ROUTINE PERIODIC CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN US AND SOVIET MISSIONS, WE BRIEFED SOVIETS ON STATUS OF NPT EXPORTERS COMMITTEE DISCUSSIONS, NEGOTIATIONS ON DURATION AND TERMINATION OF SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS, US VOLUNTARY SAFEGUARDS OFFER, AND NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE. END SUMMARY

1. US AND SOVIET MISSIONS MET NOVEMBER 27. US REPORTED ON RECENT MEETING OF NPT EXPORTERS (ZANGGER COMMITTEE - IAEA VIENNA 9649). WE SAID NO OBJECTIONS HAD BEEN RAISED TO TRIGGER LIST, AS AMENDED THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS WITH SOVIETS, EXCEPT BY TWO COUNTRIES WE DID NOT NAME THAT HAD CONDITIONED THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF INCLUSION OF ZIRCONIUM TUBING ON RECEIPT OF ASSURANCES FROM FRENCH THAT THEY WOULD ABIDE BY COMMITTEE'S UNDERSTANDINGS. WE GAVE SOVIETS TEXT OF EC STATEMENT AT MEETING AND TOLD THEM COMMITTEE HAD AGREED MEET WHENEVER EC HAD ANYTHING FURTHER TO REPORT ON DISCUSSIONS WITH FRENCH, BUT IN ANY EVENT NOT LATER THAN FEBRUARY.

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WE SAID WE HAD PROPOSED THAT COMMITTEE CONSIDER AT ITS

NEXT MEETING WHETHER AT LEAST THOSE STATES PARTY TO NPT COULD NOT AT THAT TIME AGREE TO GO AHEAD WITH EXCHANGE OF MEMORANDA, EVEN IF NOTHING FURTHER HAD BEEN LEARNED CONCERNING FRENCH POSITION. WE SUGGESTED THAT WE MEET AGAIN WITH SOVIETS IN JANUARY TO REVIEW SITUATION AND POSSIBILITY OF SOVIETS JOINING US AND SOME OTHER EXPORTERS IN EXCHANGE OF MEMORANDA IN EARLY 1974. WE THOUGHT MOST OF NPT PARTIES ON COMMITTEE WOULD JOIN US.

2. AMBASSADOR ARKADIEV ASKED ABOUT TEXT OF MEMORANDA USSR WOULD BE EXPECTED TO SEND, AND WE WENT THROUGH TEXT WITH HIM. HE NOTED THAT UNEXPURGATED MEMORANDUM APPEARS TO PRESUPPOSE CONTINUED EXISTENCE OF COMMITTEE AND ITS SECRETARY. WE AGREED, BUT SAID IT WAS UNDERSTOOD THAT COMMITTEE MIGHT DISSOLVE, OR CHANGE ITS NAME; PICK A NEW CHAIRMAN AND SECRETARY, OR ABOLISH THEIR POSITIONS, OR AGREE TO ROTATE THEM AMONG INTERESTED EXPORTERS. THE COMMITTEE'S INTEREST IN SOVIET PARTICIPATION WOULD BE MAJOR FACTOR IN ITS EVENTUAL DECISION ON ORGANIZATIONAL QUESTIONS. SOVIETS DID NOT PURSUE FURTHER. WE TOOK OPPORTUNITY SAY WE THOUGHT SOVIETS SHOULD NOT LIMIT THEMSELVES TO SENDING MEMORANDA TO US AND UK, AS THEY HAD SUGGESTED EARLIER, BUT SHOULD SEND TO ALL IMPORTANT MEMBERS OF COMMITTEE, PARTICULARLY EC MEMBERS AND JAPAN. WE TOLD THEM EC STATES HAD EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT POSSIBILITY USSR MIGHT NOT RPT NOT BE WILLING EXCHANGE MEMORANDA WITH THEM. SOVIETS DID NOT COMMIT THEMSELVES, BUT APPEARED TO TAKE POINT.

3. SOVIETS ASKED ABOUT STATUS OF GOV/1621, PROPOSALS CONCERNING DURATION AND TERMINATION OF NON-NPT SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS WHICH HAD BEEN POSTPONED TO FEBRUARY IAEA BOARD MEETING. WE SAID WE AND BRITISH HAD WORKED OUT WITH INDIANS FOLLOWING DECISION WHICH FEBRUARY BOARD COULD TAKE BY CONSENSUS:
"BOARD CONSIDERS THAT CONCEPTS SET FORTH IN GOV/1621 SHOULD NORMALLY BE REFLECTED IN SUCH AGREEMENTS AS MAY HENCEFORTH BE CONCLUDED UNDER AGENCY'S SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM (1965, AS PROVISIONALLY EXTENDED IN 1966 AND 1968). HOWEVER, IF STATE OR STATES CONCERNED IN CONFIDENTIAL

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NEGOTIATION OF ANY SUCH AGREEMENT CONSIDER THAT THERE ARE EXCEPTIONAL REASONS JUSTIFYING DEPARTURE FROM ABOVE-MENTIONED CONCEPTS, DIRECTOR GENERAL, WHEN PRESENTING DRAFT TO THE BOARD, SHALL SPECIFY ARTICLES ON WHICH IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO REACH AGREEMENT."

4. WE SAID INDIANS HAD BEEN DISCUSSING CONSENSUS WITH

FRENCH BUT WE WERE NOT SURE PARIS HAD SIGNED OFF ON IT YET. SOVIETS ASKED IF THIS CONSENSUS WOULD LEAD TO EVERY AGREEMENT THAT COMES BEFORE BOARD BEING ABNORMAL, I.E., PLEADING EXCEPTIONAL REASONS. WE SAID WE THOUGHT MOST STATES THAT MIGHT BE TEMPTED SEEK EXCEPTION FROM CONCEPTS WOULD BE DISCOURAGED BY THIS CLEAR STATEMENT OF BOARD POLICY AND BY FACT THAT DG'S COVERING MEMORANDUM PRESENTING DRAFT AGREEMENT TO BOARD WOULD, IN SUCH A CASE, SAY HE DID NOT AGREE WITH STATE'S DRAFT. BUT, OF COURSE, SOME STATE COULD INSIST ON TAKING EXCEPTIONAL DRAFT TO BOARD, BUT THIS IS ITS RIGHT ANYWAY; CONSENSUS DOES NOT GIVE THEM ANYTHING THEY DON'T ALREADY HAVE. SOVIETS SEEMED SATISFIED.

5. WE GAVE SOVIETS TEXT OF RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY FIRST COMMITTEE OF UNGA ON NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE. AMBASSADOR ARKADIEV REGRETTED THAT SECOND OPERATIVE PARA DID NOT MENTION IAEA. WE AGREED.

6. WE TOLD SOVIETS THAT, AS THEY WERE AWARE, OUR NEGOTIATIONS WITH IAEA OF AN AGREEMENT TO IMPLEMENT US VOLUNTARY OFFER TO ACCEPT IAEA SAFEGUARDS ON US PEACEFUL NUCLEAR FACILITIES WAS PROCEEDING ACTIVELY. OUR APPROACH IS THAT ALL SUCH FACILITIES WILL BE ELIGIBLE FOR SAFEGUARDS, AND IAEA HAS RIGHT BUT NOT OBLIGATION TO APPLY SAFEGUARDS TO THOSE FACILITIES THAT ARE ELIGIBLE. IMPLICATION, WHICH IS CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD BY IAEA, IS THAT NOT ALL US FACILITIES WILL BE UNDER SAFEGUARDS AT ANY ONE TIME; COST TO AGENCY'S BUDGET THEREFORE LIMITED, AND CAN BE LIMITED AT AGENCY'S DISCRETION. WE HAVE HAD SERIES OF TALKS WITH FRG IN EFFORT CONVINCE THEM THAT THIS APPROACH IS GOOD ONE AND THAT IT GIVES THEM WHAT WE PROMISED THEM AT TIME THEY
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SIGNED NPT. SOVIETS MADE NO COMMENTS AND ASKED NO QUESTIONS. COMMENT: WE DID NOT EXPECT ANY, GIVEN TRADITIONAL SOVIET RELUCTANCE HAVE ANYTHING TO DO WITH SAFEGUARDS IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES, BUT WE WANTED SOVIETS BE AWARE OF CONNECTION BETWEEN US OFFER AND FRG RATIFICATION OF TREATY AND FACT THAT APPROACH WHICH WILL LIMIT IMPACT ON AGENCY'S BUDGET REQUIRES SOME HARD BARGAINING.TAPE

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